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WHO CAN CLAIM EXCLUSION
ON PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE?
— by Neil E. Harl*
The exclusion for gain on the principal residence,1 which has been $250,000
($500,000 on a joint return) since May 6, 1997,2 has been available for individual
taxpayers as to “the taxpayer's principal residence….”3  The 1997 amendment
eliminated the age requirement (which had been age 55) and the limitation to a one-time
exclusion.
A question being raised with increasing frequency is whether other types of entities
can claim the exclusion.
Ownership by partnership
Under the revision of the exclusion in effect after the 1978 amendment which
increased the exclusion from $35,000 to $125,000, IRS ruled that ownership of a
residence through an interest in a partnership4 did not reclude eligibility for exclusion
of gain when the partnership interest was terminated.5  Howev r, if the house had been
treated as partnership property at all times, the exclusion was not available.6
Ownership by trust
Transfer of the residence to a revocable inter vivos trust apparently does not preclude
eligibility for the exclusion.7  At least, that was the case so long as the owners could
exercise the power to revoke the trust.8
For a residence held by an irrevocable inter vivos trust, the principal residence has
been considered eligible for the exclusion to the extent the owner was treated as the
owner of the trust under I.R.C. §§ 671-677.9
Ownership by bankruptcy estate
The courts are divided on whether the exclusion is available on the sale of a debtor's
principal residence by a bankruptcy estate.  In two cases decided before the 1997
amendment to the exclusion was enacted, and one case decided after the 1997
amendment became effective, the courts held that the exclusion was not available to the
bankruptcy estate.10  All involved Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation proceedings.11
However, in a series of cases decided in 1998 and 1999, all involving interpretation of
the statute as amended in 1997, a U.S. District Court12 and three Bankruptcy Courts13
have held that the exclusion could be claimed by a bankruptcy estate on sale of the
debtor's principal residence.
_____________________________________________________________________________
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The courts allowing the exclusion on sale of a principal
residence by the bankruptcy estate have reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198014 provides that—
“Except as otherwise provided by this section,15 the taxable
income of the [bankruptcy] estate shall be computed in the
same manner as for an individual.  The tax shall be
computed on such taxable income and shall be paid by the
trustee.”16
Moreover, the transfer of property to the bankruptcy estate is
not to be treated as a disposition of the property “…and the
estate shall be treated as the debtor would be with respect to
such asset.”17
Two of the recent decisions allowing the exclusion18 noted
that the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198019 also specifies that the
bankruptcy estate takes over from the debtor various tax
attributes including the holding period and the “character” of
the asset “it had in the hands of the debtor.”20  The court in the
case of In re Kerr21 concluded that to allow the exclusion
(which the court did) was consistent with In the Matter of
Kochell22 which stated that once the debtor files bankruptcy, the
estate is thereafter treated as the debtor.  Thus, in that case, the
bankruptcy estate was liable for the penalty for premature
withdrawal of funds from the debtor's IRA.23
Ownership by estate
Typically, the new income tax basis received at death24 or up
to six months after death25 l rgely eliminates the gain on post-
death sale of the principal residence.  However, if the
decedent's principal residence is sold after death with gain on
the transaction, the question is whether that gain is eligible for
the exclusion provided the ownership and use requirements are
met and the debtor had not used the exclusion within the last
two years.26
The repeal of the age requirement in 1997 eliminated one
barrier to an estate claiming the exclusion to date.  No case or
ruling has considered the eligibility of an estate for the
exclusion but it would appear that an estate should not be
prevented from claiming the exclusion if the various
requirements are met.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The debtor claimed an income
tax refund due to earned income credit as exempt, under Okla.
Stat. tit. 31, § 1.1, earnings from personal services. The court
held that the earned income credit was not exempt as wages but
was nonexempt return of overpayment of taxes. In re
Dickerson, 227 B.R. 742 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 1998)
   CHAPTER 12    -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . The IRS had filed a claim for administrative expenses
resulting from unpaid post-petition employment taxes. The
debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of the taxes
over three years, along with other installment payments of
other claims. The IRS argued that, under Section 1226(b),
